The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is over 221 years old and yet maintains its vitality; its ability to accommodate the modern era and yet remain anchored to its origins.  The text reads, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  The interplay of general language and judicial review keeps the First Amendment alive.

Over time, the First Amendment has been interpreted to apply to the states and, thus, it is not only Congress that cannot abridge speech or the press, it is state and local government as well. And “no law” does not really mean no law at all.  The courts have allowed advocacy of illegal action to be punished; attacks on reputation and privacy to be regulated; words that are lewd, obscene, profane, or “fighting words” to be regulated; obscene films to be banned, and so on.

The courts never bought the absolutist position held, e.g., by Justices Black and Douglas (i.e., no law means “no law”), but have created a large and growing body of law designed to balance, to accommodate, to grow and change.  All of which leads me to the case on point: When you purchase a ticket to a sporting event, let’s just say an NCAA basketball playoff game, what rights of vocal protest as a fan have you also purchased?

A recent New York Times article by Bill Pennington, (3/29/12), dealt beautifully with this issue.  It was stimulated by an event at a North Carolina game when two former players sitting behind the scorer’s table, not drunk or using obscenities, were ejected from the arena at the request of a referee for protesting the official’s calls.  They were complaining, yelling, and a bit acerbic. Acerbic!?  Let’s push it a bit further: Suppose their faces were painted some obnoxious colors and they wore a wolf’s head to look even more absurd and yelled their objections via a megaphone?  Would it matter if their yelling was, “we respectfully object to your flagrant abuse of the rules” or “you are friggin idiots in stripped shirts”?

What matters then; what you say?  How loud?  How long?  When?  All of the above?

In my next post I will explore the limits of free speech at sporting events relying heavily on Pennington’s excellent reporting and my former life as a basketball player and professor of constitutional law.

 

To be continued.

By On May 14, 2012 · Leave a Comment
 

In a criminal case, a prospective juror may be dismissed for cause or without cause, a so-called peremptory challenge.  The latter are limited in number while challenges for cause are unlimited.

Challenges for cause address a variety of reasons why a prospective juror could not be fair in the role as juror, e.g., a predetermination of guilt or innocence; being related to the accused; unable to understand English, and so on.  A hearing impairment does not automatically preclude a prospective juror.  The trial judge has discretion to determine if an auditory problem will interfere with the important functions that trial jurors perform.

In People v. Guay, 959 N.E.2d 504 (N.Y. 2011), New York’s highest court decided that a particular juror was properly excused for cause where the judge determined that he had trouble hearing the precise questions posed during voir dire (jury selection process). After he asked the court to repeat its preliminary instructions, the prospective juror incorrectly responded to an inquiry asking if he knew a person who had falsely confessed to a crime. Despite his remark that he would not have difficulty if he remained in the front of the jury box, the trial judge observed this individual during voir dire and apparently noticed that his body language demonstrated that he was not comprehending everything that was happening. In addition, the court expressed its concern that the hearing impairment was likely to be more problematic in this case because, in its experience, child witnesses tended to be more soft-spoken than adults.   (The defendant was charged with sexually molesting his young daughter who, in turn, would have to testify in this case.)

The court’s opinion suggests that in the future trial courts should be more attentive to finding accommodation for a hearing-impaired juror, but it finds no reversible prejudice in this case.

Summing up:  Hearing-impaired persons are not automatically excluded as jurors.  It is up to the trial judge to decide functionally on the degree of impairment and whether any accommodation is reasonably available.  The nature of the case and anticipated witness testimony are important decisional factors.

By On May 7, 2012 · Leave a Comment
 

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