Hearing Economics

HearUSA showed a profit in each year from 2001 to 2003 based on the aggregate individual office production and expenses.  HearUSA could have started retiring some of its debt.  Instead, with HEARx management now firmly holding HearUSA reins, executive compensation{{1}}[[1]]At least $1.29 million for the top four offices in 2003. For that year,  Dr. Brown and Mr. Hansbrough had respective

Alas and alack, HearUSA’s honeymoon was short and the HEARX-Helix marriage was not a happy one.  From the get go, corporate cultures clashed as top players came out fighting for control. In one corner, Steve Forget represented Helix. In the other corner, Dr Brown and Steve Hansbrough were the HEARx  team. HEARx culture prevailed. West Palm Beach, Florida was the

Last post, Duke Rodriguez table danced his way out of New Mexico politics, which were awash in Medicaid fraud allegations, ending up jobless but probably not penniless.  He turned his formidable attention to internet names and domains, bearing down on hearing industry opportunities, noting that the population was aging and hearing aids were not a covered service. Not to hold readers in

HearUSA’s wedding was marred briefly by a relative on the Canadian side named Duke Rodriguez who stood up and objected when the marriage officiant asked if there were objections to the marriage{{1}}[[1]]Just in case this ever comes up, here’s a site that tells you the etiquette for objecting to weddings [[1]]. Consequently, he was paid lots of money to stay away from

In 2002, HEARx completed the acquisition of a national hearing care company.  To properly reflect its new position in the industry, the merged entity was renamed HearUSA.  2011 HearUSA advertorial In 2001 Siemens was a supplier–not an underwriter–of HEARx and Helix in the US and Canada.  Neither company was Siemens biggest customer, so it’s legitimate to ask why Siemens extended

In fast-changing technology product markets, there is a real advantage to controlling both the hardware and the software…  {{1}}[[1]]Thomas R. Eisenmann, Professor, Harvard Business School.  https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/sunday-review/google-goes-hardware-shopping.html?ref=todayspaper [[1]] Like Google and other successful corporations, my private practice aspires to “automated efficiency” and functions as a “learning machine.”  Unlike successful corporations, my practice doesn’t score high on the learning curve nor does it

In May of 2001, HEARx and Helix Hearing Care signed a letter of intent to join together.{{1}}[[1]] https://www.audiologyonline.com/news/news_detail.asp?news_id=295[[1]]  Wedding bells started ringing in June when the bride and groom announced a financing commitment from Siemens Hearing Instruments of upwards of $70 million “if Hearx and Helix meet certain business goals” which were breathlessly outlined in typical HEARx press release fashion: {{2}}[[2]]https://www.audiologyonline.com/news/news_detail.asp?news_id=258 [[2]] The arrangement provides

HEARx entered the 21st century after a wild teenage life of excess, with lots of revenues, growing debt, a burgeoning central office, and negative profits.  HEARx was growing up and needed to get serious and find a life partner. Meanwhile, Helix Hearing, Inc. was incorporated in Cumberland, Canada in 1996 under the direction of Steve Forget (President), Jeff Giegel (CFO/VP), and Gino

Those of you attempting to follow this series may have concluded what I have about HEARx:  like Dracula, it just won’t die!  As one insider put it,  “It was a publicly traded company but most of the stock was not owned by the public. They always showed a loss and just kept issuing more and more shares” {{1}}[[1]]Support for this view comes from HEARx itself: 

As last week’s post wound down, HEARx was hurtling toward  200 retail “hearing aid stores,” 14% US marketshare, and multimillion dollar profitability  by 1991. They didn’t make it.  By 1995, the company was a penny stock (NASDAQ Bulletin Board OTC: EARS) with  only 20% of the stores projected for 5 years earlier.  HEARx wasn’t nationwide and it wasn’t profitable, although top management continued to pull down